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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet' is growing faster than all communication technologies that
preceded it.2 It took radio thirty-eight years to reach fifty million listeners. It took
television thirteen years to achieve fifty million viewers. The Internet gained fifty
million users only four years after becoming accessible to the general public.3 It is
* Copyright 1998. All rights reserved.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A., 1969,
Brooklyn College of the City University ofNew York; J.D., 1972, Rutgers University School of Law-
Camden.
The author wishes to thank Kathryn E. Reese, a second-year law student at the University of South
Carolina, for valuable research assistance in preparation of this article.
1. The Internet is an international network of linked computers and computer systems. See Reno
v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Basic Technological Terms and
Concepts, in WHAT LAWYERs NEED TO KNOW ABouT THE INTERNET 1996, at 23, 27 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3976, 1996).
2. SECRETARIATONELECTRONIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCETHEEMERGINGDIGrrAL
ECONOMY 4 [hereinafter COMMERCE DEP'T REP.].
3. Id.
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estimated that forty million people used the Internet in 1996, 4 that 100 million are
using it in 1998,' and that the number of users is expected to reach 200 million in
1999.6 Some experts predict one billion people may be connected by 2005.7 More
significantly for this symposium, business use of the Internet is growing fastest of
all."
The explosive growth of online business has raised concerns about applying
existing substantive and procedural doctrine, both largely defined by geography, to
aworld without physical borders. The law of personal jurisdiction, which emerged
from nineteenth-century territorial principles,'0 presents particularly difficult and
challenging problems. Although some commentators propose new regimes to solve
these problems," others believe existing doctrine can adequately accommodate
most Internet jurisdiction disputes. 2 Other commentators exploit unfolding
developments in cyberspace to renew attacks on existing jurisdictional doctrine,
which they view as fundamentally flawed and inherently anachronistic."
Even if flawed and anachronistic, current doctrine is being applied by courts to
resolve Internetjurisdictional disputes. 4 Although courts have reached inconsistent
4. COMMERCE DEP'T REP., supra note 2, at 2; see Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334 (noting about 40
million Internet users at the time of trial in 1996).
5. COMMERCE DEP'T REP., supra note 2, at 7.
6.Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
7. COMMERCE DEP'T REP., supra note 2, at 7.
8. Id. at 12-40.
9. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, I VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 2-6,
61 (Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.student.virginia.edu/-vjolt/voll/burk.html> (suggesting that the
geographic transparency of the Internet may require new approaches to jurisdictional analysis); David
R. Johnson & David Post, LawAndBorders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.REv. 1367
(1996) (treating cyberspace as a distinct entity requiring anew legal regime but one that is reconcilable
with existing territorially based legal systems); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41
VILL.L.REV. 1 (1996) (suggesting that traditional jurisdictional analysis must be informed by the new
technology and concluding that civiljurisdiction can accommodate the newworld ofcyberspace); Amy
Harmon, The Law Where There Is No Land, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1998, at Cl (describing the
emergence of cyberlawyers to deal with new issues presented by cyberspace).
10. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
11. See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 9, at 93-109 (reviewing proposed legal institutions).
12. See, e.g., Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction over
World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2242 (1997) (asserting that Internet
jurisdictional disputes can be properly addressed within the traditional personal jurisdiction
framework); Christine E. Mayewski, Note, The Presence of a Web Site as a Constitutionally
Permissible Basis for Personal Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 297, 327 (1997) (noting that existing
jurisdictional principles are applicable to cases involving electronic commerce and the commission of
tortious behavior); Richard S. Zembeck, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 342, 380 (1996)
(proposing that traditional legal concepts are well-suited to deal with the challenges of cyberspace
communications).
13. See, e.g., Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: PersonalJurisdictionfor the TWenty-
First Century, 66 U. CN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) (arguing for statutory reform under the full faith
and credit statute coupled with renewed emphasis on the fairness factors).
14. See discussion infra Part III.
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results on substantially similar issues,'5 there is an emerging judicial consensus on
at least two issues raised by the new technology. First, the Internet poses no novel
jurisdictional issues when used to direct communications to a specific forum state
resident by e-mail. In these instances, it is treated like other interpersonal
communications. 6 Second, a passive web site is insufficient without "something
more" to establish either general or specific jurisdiction 7 over the web site creator
in a plaintiff's chosen forum. The something-more requirement is derived from
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,8 the Supreme Court's leading non-Intemet stream of commerce case. 9
It also seems well settled that intentional torts effected through the Internet
subjecttortfeasors to jurisdiction when they specifically target forum state residents
in a calculated effort to cause harm.2° Internet cases adopting this analysis rely on
Calder v. Jones,2 the leading Supreme Courtjurisdiction case on the forum effects
of intentional torts.
There also appears to be an emerging consensus to subject web site creators to
jurisdiction when they do something beyond merely putting up a web site
accessible in the forum state. These "web-site-plus" cases have been inconsistent,
and the courts must articulate usable standards defining the quality and nature of
the additional conduct required.
This Article will examine whether existing doctrine can accommodate the
special circumstances presented by jurisdictional disputes arising from Internet
contacts. Part II briefly describes modem jurisdictional doctrine, emphasizing
constitutional due process. Part III focuses on the emerging Internet jurisdiction
case law. First, it describes areas ofjudicial consensus. Then it analyzes the "web-
site-plus," "forum effects," and other cases that have deeply divided the lower
federal courts. Part IV suggests two modifications of existing approaches to
Internet jurisdiction. First, courts should more closely analyze whether the plus
factors and forum effects are truly related to a plaintiff's cause of action. Second,
courts should place increased emphasis on the "fair play and substantial justice"'
branch of the current jurisdictional due process test. Adoption of these suggestions
will enable current doctrine to resolve most Internet jurisdiction disputes in a fair
and equitable manner.
15. See discussion infra Parts III.C-E.
16. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.
17. See discussion infra Part I.A.
18. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
19. See discussion infra Part II.C.
20. See discussion infra Part III.D.
21.465 U.S. 783 (1984).
22. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
1998]
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II. MODERN JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE
A. General and Specific Jurisdiction
The assertion of personal jurisdiction must be proper under both statutory and
constitutional law. First, a statute-generally a state long-arm provision-must
apply. Second, any statutory assertion of jurisdiction must comport with due
process. There are two types ofpersonaljurisdiction that may be asserted-general
and specific.' General jurisdiction is exercised over a cause of action arising
outside the forum state. Specific jurisdiction is exercised over a cause of action
directly arising out of, or perhaps merely relating to,24 a defendant's forum state
activity.
General jurisdiction is permissible under the Due Process Clause25 when the
defendant's connection and activities in the forum state are so substantial that the
defendant would expect to be subjectto suit there on any claim and would suffer no
inconvenience from defending there.' If a defendant is domiciled in, incorporated
or organized under forum state law, or has its principal place of business in the
forum state (the commercial equivalent of an individual's domicile), there is little
doubt that the constitutionally required substantially "systematic and continuous"
connection is satisfied. If a nonresident defendant, however, is merely doing
business in the forum state, significant interpretational problems are presented.
How much business is enough to be considered substantially systematic and
continuous? The United States Supreme Court has decided only two general
jurisdiction cases in the post-International Shoe era.27 Neither case is particularly
helpful in formulating an easily applicable definition of "substantially systematic
and continuous," and the lower federal and state courts are deeply divided on the
quality and quantity of activity required to trigger an assertion of general
jurisdiction.28
23. Professors von Mehren and Trautman are generally credited with articulating the distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A SuggestedAnalysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
24. Although frequently invoking the "related to" language, the Supreme Court has twice avoided
deciding whether specific jurisdiction can be predicated on conduct merely "related to" a defendant's
forum state conduct. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a forum
selection clause), rev'g 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting a "but for" test for "related to"
jurisdiction); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (relying
on concession). For a review of the approaches taken by the lower courts in analyzing "related to"
specific jurisdiction, see MarkM. Maloney, Note, SpecificPersonalJurisdiction andthe "Arise From
or Relate To" Requirement... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1265 (1993).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV.
26. Compare Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-19 (declining general jurisdiction), with Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,445-48 (1952) (upholding general jurisdiction).
27. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437.
28. For an analysis and conceptual approach to general jurisdiction, see Lea Brilmayer et al., A
[Vol. 49:925
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Specific jurisdiction by state courts, or federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, must be authorized by a long-arm statute. 9 When Congress has not
provided for nationwide service of process, federal courts exercising federal
question jurisdiction are also generally limited to the reach of the long-arm statute
of the state in which the federal court is located.30 Many state long-arm statutes,
either expressly or by interpretation, reach to the limits of due process.3' When a
long-arm statute reaches to the limits of due process, the two-step analysis collapses
into a single inquiry under the Due Process Clause.32
B. Modern Jurisdictional Due Process
Although the modem era reaches back to International Shoe Co. v.
Washington33 for the seminal articulation of the "minimum contacts test," the
current two-branch test of jurisdictional due process is of more recent origin.34
Beginning with its decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,"s the
United States Supreme Court articulated a two-branch due process test for state
court personal jurisdiction. 6 The first branch, frequently described as the power or
traditional minimum contacts branch,37 focuses on the connection or affiliation of
the nonresident defendant with the forum state and the relationship between that
nexus and the litigation.3"
The Supreme Court explained that beyond the requirement of minimum
GeneralLookat General Jurisdiction, 66 Tx. L. REv. 723, 735-48 (1988), and Mary Twitchell, The
Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630-43 (1988).
29. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Tllhe court
must first look to the long-arm statute of the forum state .... ."), aff'g 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[F]ederal courts apply the
law of the forum state, subject to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
30. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987) (stating
that "a federal court normally looks either to a federal statute or to the long-arm statute of the State in
which it sits"); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616,620 (C.D. Cal 1996) (stating that
where there is no applicable federal statute, federal courts must apply law of the state in which it sits),
aff'd, No. 97-55467, 1998 WVL 178553 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 1998).
31. See, e.g., Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressly); Southern
Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank, 310 S.C. 256, 260, 423 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1992) (by
interpretation).
32. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,416(9th Cir. 1997); Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake
Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying South Carolina's long-arm statute).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. For my previous outline of the modem evolution ofjurisdictional due process, see Howard B.
Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV.
729, 731-83 (1988).
35. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
36. Id. at 291-92.
37. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-10 (1987); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 US. 235,251 (1958); Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
for State andFederal Courts, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 411,423-24 (1981); Stravitz, supra note 32, at 777.
38. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,471-76 (1985).
1998]
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contacts, due process requires evaluation of other factors to test whether an
assertion ofjurisdiction comports with "'fair play and substantial justice."' 39 This
branch is frequently referred to as the fairness, convenience, or reasonableness
branch.4"
The Court has developed several tests to determ'ine traditional minimum
contacts under the power branch: (1) whether the defendant "'purposefully
direct[s]' his activities at residents of the forum and [whether] the litigation results
from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities";4" (2) whether
the defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"';
42
and (3) whether 'defendant's conduct and connections with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.' 4, 3 It is not
necessary that each test be satisfied separately to find that a defendant has
purposefully established minimum contacts.44
If a defendant purposefully directs activities toward forum state residents,
Burger King further states that "it is presumptively not unreasonable to require [the
defendant] to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well." '45 The
presumption may be either enhanced or overcome by evaluation of other factors to
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports with "'fair play and
substantial justice."'46 The other factors are: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2)
the adjudicative interest of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the systemic interest of the national judicial
system in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the litigation; and (5) the
systemic interest in furthering substantive social policies.47
Consequently, Burger King plainly contemplates a positive threshold finding
of traditional minimum contacts under the power branch before a court proceeds to
the fairness branch. The Fourth Circuit followed Burger King's two-step
framework in Chung v. NANA Development Corp.,48 in which Judge Wilkinson
wrote as follows:
Because personal jurisdiction here fails the threshold test of
"minimum contacts," we need not separately consider the convenience of
any particular forum to the respective parties .... Factors such as the
39. Id. at 476 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
40. See Stravitz, supra note 32, at 753-54, 776-77, 780-82.
41. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-73 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
43. Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980)).
44. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 & n.6, 789 (1984) (upholding jurisdiction over
an author and editor based exclusively on the forum effects test).
45. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
46. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
47. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
48.783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986).
[Vol. 49:925
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burden on the defendant, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining effective
relief, and the forum state's concern with adjudicating the dispute are
generally addressed only after "it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum State .... 9
Many other lower federal and state courts also expressly find it unnecessary to
reach the reasonableness factors if minimum contacts are lacking." Some courts,
however, even in the absence of minimum contacts, consider second-branch
factors."'
Justice Brennan, who authored Burger King, did not, however, contemplate a
high threshold to establish minimum contacts. He indicated that the second-branch
factors may tip the jurisdictional balance in close cases. Justice Brennan stated that
they "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness ofjurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required," 2 but they also
"may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purpose-
fully engaged in forum activities."53
As the Court's leading advocate of jurisdictional analysis focusing on the
relative convenience of the parties and the interests of the forum state,54 Justice
Brennan attempted to make the first branch an easy obstacle to hurdle, while
49. Id. at 1129-30 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476). In Federal Insurance Co. v. Lake
Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit, after a finding of no minimum
contacts, concluded in dicta that the reasonableness factors were an independent ground for dismissal
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
50. The First Circuit adheres to this view, expressly labeling the "reasonableness" factors
"secondary rather than primary" and stating that "[a] reviewing court must first examine the
defendant's contacts with the forum. If the same do not exist in sufficient abundance, that is, if the
constitutionally necessary first-tier minimum is lacking, the inquiry ends." Donatelli v. National
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); accord McGlinchy v. Shell
Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1988); Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 736
P.2d 2,5-6 &n.1 (Ariz. 1987) ("Because we find that Tennessee Farmers has not purposefully engaged
in forum activities.., we do not address [the] additional factors."); Felix v. Bomoro Kommanditgesell-
schaft 241 Cal. Rptr. 670, 676-77 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Having determined that defendant's contacts with
California are insufficient to justify jurisdiction, we need not undertake the additional process of
balancing the inconvenience of defending the action in this state against the interests of plaintiff in
suing locally and of the state in assuming jurisdiction."); Missouri ex rel. Wichita Falls Gen. Hosp. v.
Adolf, 728 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("We do not find that sufficient minimum contacts
are present here to require exploration of additional factors.").
51. See, e.g., Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369,374-75 (8th Cir. 1990)
(expressly interpreting Asahi as mandating analysis ofthe "reasonableness" factors even in the absence
of minimum contacts).
52. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
53.Id. at 478.
54. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of the contacts necessary
to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consideration helped establish that jurisdiction
would be fair and reasonable. The interests of the State and other parties in proceeding with the case
in a particular forum are such considerations.").
1998]
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placing principal emphasis on the fair play and substantial justice branch.
C. Stream of Commerce Split
Justice Brennan's views proved partially prophetic inAsahi MetalIndustry Co.
v. Superior Court,55 the Supreme Court's leading stream of commerce case. 6
Divided into conflicting four-justice pluralities, the Court was unable to decide
whether a Japanese component parts manufacturer established minimum contacts
with California. All members of the Court except Justice Scalia,57 however,
concluded that California's assertion of jurisdiction was "unreasonable and
unfair." 8 Justice Brennan agreed that this was "one of those rare cases" 9 in which
the fair play and substantial justice factors trump minimum contacts.'
Asahi articulated three standards for establishing minimum contacts in a stream
of commerce case. Justice O'Connor's opinion concluded that "[t]he placement of
a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State."'" Her opinion, however, recognized
that "[a]dditional conduct of the defendant," such as specifically designing,
advertising, advising, or marketing with specific reference to the forum state, may
be sufficient to establish minimum contacts.62 In contrast, Justice Brennan
articulated a pure stream of commerce view by suggesting that the mere awareness
that a product is being distributed in the forum state is sufficient to establish
minimum contacts without any showing of something more.63 Justice Stevens did
not join either plurality, but wrote separately suggesting that "a regular course of
dealing [by a defendant] that results in deliveries... annually over a period of
several years" should be jurisdictionally sufficient even for a "standard product
marketed throughout the world."'  Justice O'Connor's views have prevailed for
jurisdictional disputes on the electronic stream of commerce.65
55. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
56. For an excellent analysis of the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction, see Kim
Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LrITG. 239 (1988).
57. Justice Scalia only joined Justice O'Connor on minimum contacts. Id. at 105. Since Justice
O'Connor found no minimum contacts, Justice Scalia must have viewed second-branch analysis as
unnecessary.
58. Id. at 116.
59. 1d. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
60. See id.
61. 1d. at 112 (emphasis added).
62.Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
63. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
64. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
65. See discussion infra Part I.E.
[Vol. 49:925
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D. Effects Test
In Calder v. Jones66 the Court upheld jurisdiction in California over two
Florida individuals because their activity in Florida was deliberately targeted at, and
calculated to cause injury to, the California plaintiff.' In doing so, the Supreme
Court expressly approved the "forum effects" test of the Second Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws.68 The Florida individuals were the author and editor of an
alleged libelous article published in the National Enquirer. Neither the editor nor
author had any material personal contact with California. Accordingly, there was
no basis for the Court to find that either of them purposefully availed themselves of
the benefits and protection of California law. Nevertheless, it was reasonably
foreseeable that their Florida conduct would cause harm in California. Therefore,
by expressly aiming their intentional conduct at California knowing that the subject
of their story would suffer maximum harm there, the Florida defendants should
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in California.69 The effects test
has been the focus of much controversy in jurisdictional disputes arising from use
of the Internet.7
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
Although Internet cases are flooding the federal district courts, there have been
only four federal appeals court decisions resolving online jurisdictional disputes.'
Even though some cases exclusively rely on long-arm statutes to resolve these
disputes,' the vast majority of decisions engage in both statutory and constitutional
analysis. Because many state long-arm statutes reach to the limits of due process,
the two-step analysis generally transforms into a single constitutional inquiry. 3
Accordingly, this discussion will focus on jurisdictional due process.
66. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
67. Id. at 787 n.6, 788-89, 791.
68. d at 787 n.6, 789.
69. Id. at 790 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
70. See discussion infra Part III.D.
71. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, No. 97-55467, 1998 WL 178553 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 1998),
afflg 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.
1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying onNewYorklong-arm
statute), aff'g 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996). Cf Homell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998)
(tribal court subject matter jurisdiction).
72. See, e.g., Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 27 (New York statute); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp.,
989 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Conn. 1997) (Connecticut statute); Telco Communications v. An Apple A
Day, 977 F. Supp. 404,405 (E.D. Va. 1997) (Virginia statute).
73. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
1998]
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A. When the Internet is Analogous to Other Communications Media
If the Internet is used to direct communication to a particular forum state
resident, for example, when an e-mail message is sent and delivered, the Internet is
not any different than other forms of direct communication. Courts have had little
difficulty applying conventional analysis in these circumstances. For example, if a
fraudulent misrepresentation is made to a forum state securities purchaser by a
nonresident broker, it hardly matters whether the misrepresentation is made by
traditional or electronic mail.74 Similarly, a contract can be breached by e-mail as
well as more traditional methods of person-to-person communication." In these
instances, the misrepresentation or breach is purposefully directed at a forum state
resident the forum plaintiffs cause of action directly arises out of the electronic
communication, and the nonresident sender of the e-mail should, under traditional
analysis, reasonably anticipate forum state litigation.
B. No General Jurisdiction
With one notable exception,76 courts have universally rejected the argument
that putting up a generally accessible web site permits assertion of general
jurisdiction over the web site creator.77 The argument albeit unsuccessful, is that
because the web site is always available online to forum state residents, the web
site owner is maintaining substantially systematic and continuous contact with the
forum state. This line of cases illustrates a fundamental distinction between the new
digital world of the Internet and its analog predecessors. Only through the Internet
can a potential defendant maintain contact at all times with a forum state. Outside
the Internet context, advertisements in national periodicals are limited by time and
74. See, e.g., Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (D. Conn. 1997) (Connecticut securities fraud
action based on California defendants e-mail and telephone calls).
75. See, e.g., Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding jurisdiction
over a contract dispute negotiated exclusively by e-mail and telephone).
76. See Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., No. 5:96CV286, 1998 WL 125678, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 18, 1998) (interactive web site that responds to consumer product inquires is sufficient without
more to establish general jurisdiction).
77. See, e.g., Green v. William Mason & Co., No. CIV.A.96-1730, 1998 WL 120257, at *5-6
(DN.J. Mar. 5, 1998) (rejecting jurisdiction in New Jersey over a California bank based on aweb site
and toll-free telephone number, which plaintiff argued were equivalent to an office in New Jersey);
Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333-34 (D.N.J. 1997) (no general jurisdiction based on web
site in New Jersey in an action for injury suffered at an Italian hotel); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356,1365 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (advertising in a trade journal available on the Internet
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a Hong Kong manufacturer in a wrongful death action in
Arkansas); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (no general
jurisdiction over California defendant on an unfair competition claim unrelated to defendant's web site,
other national advertising, and toll-free telephone number); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1828 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (rejecting general jurisdiction over a Minnesota advertising
agency in a copyright dispute over a photograph not transmitted over defendant's web site).
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space. Even though the case law regarding the extent of continuous and systematic
business contact necessary to establish general jurisdiction is unsettled, it appears
that most courts are correctly deciding Internet disputes in this context.
C. Forum State Databases
One feature of the Internet that makes it jurisdictionally unique is that a user
generally has no knowledge of the physical location of the web site being
downloaded. Because the same electronic information may be stored and
transferred from different locations, knowledge of any particular geographic
location is generally irrelevant to the user. Nevertheless, the courts are divided over
whether a subscriber to an Internet service can be sued in the jurisdiction in which
the service maintains its database.78
In the seminal modem Internet jurisdiction case, CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson,79 the Sixth Circuit upheld jurisdiction in Ohio over a Texas citizen who
had entered into an agreement with CompuServe, an Interet provider located in
Ohio. The agreement ° provided for CompuServe to distribute Patterson's software
online. For three years Patterson uploaded and advertised his software on
CompuServe's system, apparently resulting in sales to twelve Ohio residents and an
unstated number of other CompuServe subscribers.8' When CompuServe began
distributing its own similar software, Patterson threatened to sue CompuServe for
trademark infringement and deceptive trade practices. 2 In response, CompuServe
filed a diversity action in an Ohio federal court seeking declaratory relief that it had
not infringed Patterson's common-law trademark or committed deceptive trade
practices.83 Patterson successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in the district court. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding jurisdiction
proper under both the Ohio long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause because
the agreement between Patterson and CompuServe created a substantial connection
with Ohio.84 More significantly, the agreement, which was ongoing in nature,
contained an Ohio choice-of-law provision. 5
Although severely criticized by Professor Burk, 6 the court's analysis,
78. Compare CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding
jurisdiction), with Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. CL
App.), rev. denied, 645 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1994) (denying jurisdiction).
79. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
80. Id. at 1260. The agreement is a "Shareware Registration Agreement," under which
CompuServe made available Patterson's software to its subscribers. Id.
81. Id. at 1261.
82. Id.
83.Id.
84. Id. at 1264-65.
85. Compuserv, 89 F.3d at 1260.
86. See Burk, supra note 9, 35-39, in which Professor Burk points out that Patterson's
common-law trademark and deceptive practices case did not directly arise out of his contract with
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according to another commentator, is not materially distinguishable from the
Supreme Court's own analysis in Burger King." Patterson certainly directed his
activities at Ohio in a manner sufficient both to invoke the benefits and protections
of Ohio law, and to reasonably anticipate litigation in Ohio related to the contract.
The other forum database case was Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct
Access, Inc.,"s in which a Florida appellate court refused to uphold jurisdiction over
a New York travel agency that contracted with the Florida plaintiff for access to its
computerized airline reservation system. When the system malfunctioned, the New
York defendant stopped making payments under the contract, and the Florida
database provider sued for breach in Florida. The only Florida contacts were the
payments and the physical location of the system in Florida. Finding that there was
no showing that the New York "defendant was even aware of the exact electronic
location of the.., computer database," 9 which in any event "would have been of
little importance to it," the court found that there was no reasonable expectation of
Florida litigation over a contract solicited, negotiated, and serviced by the plaintiff
in New York.' The court also observed that nonresident subscribers to online
services should not be automatically subject to jurisdiction in their suppliers' home
states. This early online decision was also similar to Burger King, except that there
apparently was no choice-of-law provision in the contract.9
D. Forum Effects ofIntentional Torts
As discussed earlier, Calder endorsed the forum effects test for specific
personal jurisdiction. 2 If a nonresident defendant deliberately directs activity
toward the forum in a calculated effort to cause a plaintiff harm there, the defendant
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.' Although two
recent commentators characterized the effects test as the root cause of all
contradictory Internet-jurisdiction decisions,94 that test, when properly understood
and applied, can be a useful tool in resolving online jurisdictional disputes.
CompuServe. Although this point is reasonable, it takes an unduly narrow view of the nature of the
dispute between Patterson and CompuServe. Cf Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926) (taking an expansive view of transactionally related claims for ancillary jurisdiction). Even if
Professor Burk is correct that Patterson's claims, and CompuServe's reactive declaratory judgment
action, did not directly arise out of their contract, they were certainly "related to" the contract. See
supra note 23.
87. See Sheehan, supra note 13 ("mhe case for jurisdiction over Patterson may be stronger than
in Burger King because Patterson actually intended to sell his products in Ohio .... ).
88. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 645 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1994)
89. Id. at 1353.
90.Id.
91. It was clear, however, that there was no forum selection clause. See id. at 1352-53.
92. See discussion supra Part II.D.
93. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
94. Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and the
Internet, LITIG., Winter 1998, at 27, 29.
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Under Calder knowledge that a plaintiff will suffer maximum and foreseeable
harm in the forum state is critical to the jurisdictional calculus. Unfortunately, in
EDIAS Software International, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd." an Arizona
federal court plainly misapplied the Calder effects test in upholding jurisdiction
over a New Mexico software company. Plaintiffs were two European business
entities and an Arizona limited liability company, all named EDIAS Software
International. EDIAS, collectively treated as one entity by the court, entered into a
contract to distribute defendant's software in various European countries. The
contract was signed in New Mexico, and was governed by New Mexico law. After
becoming dissatisfied with EDIAS's performance, BASIS, the New Mexico
defendant, terminated the agreement, and e-mailed its reasons for doing so to its
regular European customers and its own employees. BASIS also posted these
reasons on its web site and a CompuServe forum. Claiming Arizona as its principal
place of business, EDIAS sued BASIS for breach of contiact and libel in Arizona.
BASIS disputed the plaintiff's assertion that Arizona was its principal place of
business, claiming that Arizona was merely the location of a vacation home for
plaintiff's president.96 Nevertheless, the court upheld jurisdiction in Arizona on the
effects test. This decision is fundamentally flawed. If EDIAS suffered harm, it was
plainly in Europe, the only place where it did business, and not in Arizona, where
it had no business.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the effects test in Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen,97 a domain name98 dispute involving a notorious
"eybersquatter," or "cyberpirate."''  Panavision is a limited partnership
headquartered in California. It holds federally registered trademarks for
"Panavision" and "Panaflex," which if uses in its motion picture, television camera,
and photographic equipment business."'1 When Panavision attempted to register
"Panavision.com" as a web site, it was unable to do so because Toeppen, an Illinois
citizen, had previously registered that domain name. When Panavision demanded
that he stop using their registered trademark as a domain name, Toeppen demanded
$13,000 to give it up. Rather than submitting to extortion, Panavision filed an
95. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
96. Id. at 416.
97. No. 97-55467, 1998 WL 178553 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 1998), aff'g 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal
1996).
98. Domain names are the way Internet users communicate with other computers and web sites.
Each web site on the Internet has an unique electronic address. For a useful description of domain
names, see Charles H. Fleischer, Will the Internet Abrogate Territorial Limits on Personal
Jurisdiction, 33 TORT & INs. L.J. 107, 114-15 (1997).
99. A cybersquatter is someone who registers a domain name that, at least in part, includes a
registered trademark of someone else, and who attempts to extract payment for relinquishing the
domain name to the trademark holder. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No., 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
100. Panavision, 1998 WL 178553, at *1.
101. Id. at *2.
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action in a California federal court raising trademark dilution claims.
Affirning the district court's assertion of Californiajurisdiction over Toeppen,
the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court properly applied the Calder effects test.
The court's language is instructive:
Toeppen purposefully registered Panavision's trademarks as his domain
names on the Internet to force Panavision to pay him money. The brunt of
the harm to Panavision was felt in California. Toeppen knew Panavision
would likely suffer harm there because, although at all relevant times
Panavision was a Delaware limited partnership, its principal place of
business was in California, and the heart of the theatrical motion picture
and television industry is located there.2
Perhaps Panavision is a unique case. Unlike a national business entity, which may
suffer harm in many geographic locations, Panavision was principally engaged in
California activities. Therefore the injury suffered was primarily focused in
California, and Toeppen should have known that his action would cause harm to
Panavision where the entertainment industry was centered. Unfortunately, other
courts have misplaced reliance on the effects test when the harm suffered by
plaintiffs was not principally focused on the forum state. °3
The effects test is useful in establishing minimum contacts only when a
defendant directs online activity in a targeted manner to cause harm. In these
circumstances, the nonresident defendant should reasonably anticipate forum state
litigation. However, a defendant should not expect to be sued any place where an
alleged tortious web site is accessible. The harm must be targeted as in Calder and
Panavision for the Due Process Clause to have any meaningful application to
Internet activity.
E. The Web-Site-Plus Cases
Most courts have decided that the mere maintenance of a passive web site,
which is analogous to a national newspaper advertisement with an 800-telephone
number, is insufficiently purposeful to establish minimum contacts in any forum
where the web site is accessible." g The leading case articulating this view is
102. Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, No. 1:97-CV-1228, 1997 WVL 835481 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 23, 1997) (upholding jurisdiction under the Ohio long-arm statute because aweb site caused
tortious injury); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (web site
for prospective online service caused harmful effect in Missouri satisfying long-arm statute).
104. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,419 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[a]ll that it
did was post an essentially passive home page on the web"); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), aff'g 937 F. Supp. 295,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (general access passive web site);
SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Ins., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032,1035 (D. Kan. 1997) (general access passive web
site); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (N.D. I1. 1997). But see
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Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,"5 in which the district court expressly
endorsed Justice O'Connor's Asahi stream of commerce view: "Creating a site,
like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward
the forum state."'" Although O'Connor's requirement of something more is
unnecessary in the ordinary product liability context, °7 it appears both necessary
and appropriate for the electronic stream of commerce. Because a web site is
accessible at all times to Internet users in any particular forum, it is reasonable to
require additional conduct, beyond putting up the web site, to establish minimum
contacts. Otherwise, personal jurisdiction over web site creators would have no
rational limits. The issue that has profoundly divided the lower courts is how much
more is required? The current hodgepodge of case law is inconsistent, irrational,
and irreconcilable. Some courts find that the requirement of something more is
satisfied by any additional activity, no matter how marginal.0 8 Other courts
properly require that additional conduct be meaningful and related to the forum
plaintiff's claims. In these instances, defendants generally ship offending products
into the forum state in addition to maintaining a web site,"° or enter into
agreements to provide online services to substantial numbers of forum state
residents."°The web-site-plus cases will continue to produce unacceptable results
unless the courts take a new approach to resolving online jurisdictional disputes.
IV. SOLUTION: BACK TO BURGER K!NG'S INTENDED FRAMEWORK
Disputes over personal jurisdiction arising from Internet contact cannot be
resolved by equally objectionable extremes-jurisdiction everywhere or
jurisdiction nowhere. Some reasonably predictable middle position is desirable.
There appears to be no rational ground on which to reconcile the spate of
conflicting opinions, particularly when the web-site-plus analysis is invoked. When
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) (passive web site sufficient); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Conn. 1996) (same).
105.937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a.ffd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
106. Id. at 301 (emphasis added); accord Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1170, (D. Mass. 1997).
107. See Stravitz, supra note 32, at 788-90 & n.328.
108. See, e.g., American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp.
494,498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (six New York subscribers generating $150 per month in revenues was
found sufficient); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1770, 1775 (W.D.N.C. 1997)
(passive web site plus presumed numerous North Carolina hits); Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 4-5 (web site
plus advertisement in a local newspaper held sufficient); Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (finding 131
"hits" to defendant's allegedly infringing web site for a future online service sufficient).
109. See, e.g., Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997) (maintaining
a web site plus shipping infringing products into state).
110. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(maintaining a web site plus contracts with three thousand Pennsylvania subscribers, representing two
percent of defendant's customer base).
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the Calder effects analysis is employed, however, courts can and should be more
circumspect in finding forum effects. Only when a nonresident defendant
intentionally engages in conduct expressly targeted at the forum state or its
residents can a court rationally conclude that a defendant should reasonably
anticipate being haled'into court there. Negligent or other unintended effects are
too easily accomplished when business is conducted over the Internet, and should
not be a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction. Perhaps courts can improve their
consistency by adopting this modest limitation on the effects test. Meaningful
progress, however, will require more fundamental change.
Although most courts deciding Internet jurisdictional disputes engage in two-
branch due process analysis, many of their opinions seem primarily grounded on
conventional views of minimum contacts. The fair play and substantial justice
branch either gets short shrift or is added as an afterthought to buttress a decision
already made.
As noted earlier, Burger King intended to focus jurisdictional due process on
the second branch."' Certainly Justice Brennan intended the second branch to tip
the jurisdictional balance in close cases. But a closer reading of his Burger King
opinion reveals that he intended the so-called "other factors" to play an even more
significant role. Dissenting in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan expressed
the view that the minimum contacts test, with its intense focus on the defendant's
connection to the forum state, was outmoded."' It is even more outmoded today,
almost twenty years later.
Any Internet contact, except perhaps a passive web site, should be sufficient to
pass muster under the minimum contacts branch. Acceptance of this view
eliminates the need to engage in inherently subjective determinations of purposeful-
ness. This is true outside the Internet context as well.
Shifting emphasis to the second-branch convenience factors will allow
jurisdiction to be asserted unless the chosen forum is fundamentally unfair.
Modem modes of transportation and communication have eliminated most burdens
in litigating away from one's home base. This is especially true for defendants who
frequently engage in interstate and international business transactions.
Focusing the crucial due process analysis on the second branch may not
substantially improve predictability. But at least the inquiry will focus on fair play
and substantial justice, which are the objectives that the Due Process Clause is
intended to promote.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Internet transcends geography, it is the ideal context in which to
finally discard the territorial ghost of Pennoyer, and focus jurisdictional analysis
111. See supra notes 43-46, 49-51 and accompanying text.
112. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 307-12 (1980).
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squarely on whether a chosen forum will provide all parties with fair play and
substantial justice.
Borrowing Winston Churchill's description of Russia in the 1930s, the First
Circuit once described the doctrinal vagaries of personal jurisdiction as a "riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.".. Internet jurisdictional disputes present
the courts with an opportunity to solve the "riddle," unwrap the "mystery," and
explain the "enigma."
113. Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459,462 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Winston
Churchill).
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